Skepra / Web recovery & resilience

Atomic Arch: AUR Package Supply Chain Compromise Using Malicious npm Package

If a client website build or CI runner installed @sfunction/dsh-screenshot 0.1.1, the first decision is whether it was only resolved, installed or actually executed, and what evidence is needed before the runner can be trusted again.

Discuss the next recovery or maintenance decision

If a client website build or CI runner installed @sfunction/dsh-screenshot 0.1.1, the first decision is whether it was only resolved, installed or actually executed, and what evidence is needed before the runner can be trusted again.

Check the exact package boundary

The GitHub Advisory Database record identifies the exact package and version and does not provide a fixed version. Applicability requires an exact lockfile, install record or execution trace. This does not establish that a Skepra reader or named client used the package.

Preserve evidence before cleanup

Keep the lockfile, package-manager metadata, CI job identifier and time window before changing dependencies. Separate resolution from execution. A package in a lockfile is not proof that lifecycle code ran, while an install log or CI step can establish a stronger fact. Do not install the package to reproduce it.

Use a trusted-machine handoff

Record the exact package and dependency path, execution evidence, runner identity and approved replacement. If an untrusted runner had access to tokens, the credential owner decides the rotation scope. Do not claim client compromise without independent evidence.

Accept the replacement build

Rebuild from a trusted machine, compare the intended artifact and record the reviewer, unresolved questions and recovery owner. Removing a package from the lockfile prevents a future install but does not prove that an earlier runner is clean.

Limits

This is a conditional agency/client build scenario. It does not claim a particular project was affected or that a fixed version exists. No client environment was scanned.